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Abstract
Major online platforms today can be thought of as two-sided
markets with producers and customers of goods and services.
There have been concerns that over-emphasis on customer
satisfaction by the platforms may affect the well-being of the
producers. To counter such issues, few recent works have at-
tempted to incorporate fairness for the producers. However,
these studies have overlooked an important issue in such
platforms – to supposedly improve customer utility, the un-
derlying algorithms are frequently updated, causing abrupt
changes in the exposure of producers. In this work, we focus
on the fairness issues arising out of such frequent updates,
and argue for incremental updates of the platform algorithms
so that the producers have enough time to adjust (both lo-
gistically and mentally) to the change. However, naive incre-
mental updates may become unfair to the customers. Thus
focusing on recommendations deployed on two-sided plat-
forms, we formulate an ILP based online optimization to de-
ploy changes incrementally in η steps, where we can ensure
smooth transition of the exposure of items while guarantee-
ing a minimum utility for every customer. Evaluations over
multiple real world datasets show that our proposed mecha-
nism for platform updates can be efficient and fair to both the
producers and the customers in two-sided platforms.
1 Introduction
Many popular online platforms today can be thought of as
two-sided markets, such as, sharing economy platforms like
Uber, Lyft or Airbnb, e-commerce sites like Amazon, news
aggregation services like Google News, location-based re-
view and recommendation services like Yelp, Google Local,
employment sites like LinkedIn, Indeed, or hotel aggrega-
tors like Booking.com. There are three stakeholders in these
markets: (i) producers of goods and services (e.g., sellers in
Amazon, hosts in Airbnb), (ii) customers who pay for them,
and (iii) the platform at the center of the ecosystem. Ser-
vices on these platforms have traditionally been designed to
maximize customer satisfaction, since they are the ones di-
rectly contributing to the platform revenue, largely ignoring
the interest of the other key stakeholder – producers.
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Several recent studies have shown how sole focus on the
customers may adversely affect the well-being of the pro-
ducers, as more and more people are depending on two-
sided platforms to earn a living (Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky
2017; Hanna´k et al. 2017; Abdollahpouri and Burke 2019;
Chakraborty et al. 2017; Burke 2017; Graham, Hjorth, and
Lehdonvirta 2017). Subsequently, few research works have
attempted to reduce unfairness in these platforms (Su¨hr et
al. 2019; Su¨rer, Burke, and Malthouse 2018; Geyik, Am-
bler, and Kenthapadi 2019). However, existing works have
overlooked an important issue. They assume that the un-
derlying platform algorithms remain unchanged; whereas,
to offer supposedly higher customer utility, the platform al-
gorithms go through frequent changes and updates. Such up-
dates are often very rapid and immediate, leaving no room
for the producers to adjust to them. For example, with every
change in the Facebook Newsfeed curation algorithm, news
media outlets (i.e., the producers of news stories) complain
about immediate drop in traffic to their websites (Lab 2019;
AdExchanger 2018). Similar complaints have been reported
also for other two-sided platforms like Amazon (Vox 2019).
While maximizing customer’s utility may be paramount,
we argue that the platform also needs to be fair to the produc-
ers while updating. Multiple works in behavioral economics
have shown that human perceptions of fairness of a new de-
cision making system are influenced by how far the decision
outcomes change from the status quo (i.e., the existing out-
comes) (Bediou and Scherer 2014; Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler 1991). Motivated by this line of work, in this paper,
we propose the notion of Egocentric Fairness for the pro-
ducers, which requires that the impact of the changed system
should be limited/small. We argue that a simple way of being
fair would be to implement the change in a phased manner.
This also has its practical advantage whereby a producer gets
time to adjust to the change in demand.
One naive way of incremental update would be to change
the platform for only a subset of customers and then grad-
ually cover everyone. However, such an approach may be
unfair to the customers. Since the change is supposed to
provide higher satisfaction (utility) for the customers, those
who experience the changed platform earlier will get higher
utility than the customers covered later. To ensure fairness
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to the customers, we formulate a constrained optimization
problem whereby at every stage every customer is guaran-
teed a minimum utility, while the average change in expo-
sure of the producers should be minimal. To model this up-
date mechanism, in this paper, we focus on the recommenda-
tion systems deployed on two-sided platforms (we consider
Amazon products and Google Local datasets), and consider
three common types of updates: (i) addition of new features
to better estimate customer preferences, (ii) deployment of a
new recommendation algorithm reflecting technological ad-
vances, or (iii) addition of more data/customer feedback to
account for the ever-changing choices of the customers.
The paper progresses in the following fashion, in §4 we
introduce the datasets and update types, and perform a de-
tailed experiment to show the impact of immediate update
on the producers. The findings help us to succinctly define
fairness from the perspective of producers and customers.
Based upon this understanding of both-sided fairness, the
constrained optimization formulation is developed in §5.
The formulation takes into consideration several practical
details – for example, optimization has to be performed at
the level of each customer arrival and one may or may not
have an estimate of the amount of changes which would hap-
pen if an update is applied. The experimental results show
that both efficiency and fairness are ensured to the produc-
ers as well as the customers; the experiments bring forward
the lacunae of updating algorithms popular in software engi-
neering domain (used as baselines). To our knowledge, this
is the first paper which focuses on issues associated with up-
dates on two-sided platforms, and we believe that this work
will be an important addition to the growing literature on
fairness of algorithmic decision making systems.
2 Background and Related work
Fairness in Multi-Sided Platforms: Recently, few works
have looked into the issues of unfairness and biases in plat-
forms with multiple stakeholders. Disparity in customer util-
ities has lead to the concerns of both individual and group
fairness for customers. For example, studies have found
instances of group unfairness – gender-based discrimina-
tion in career ads (Lambrecht and Tucker 2019), or racial
bias in guest acceptance by Airbnb hosts (Edelman, Luca,
and Svirsky 2017). On the other hand, (Serbos et al. 2017)
have looked into individual customer fairness by studying
the problem of envy free tour package recommendations on
travel booking sites. Similarly, producer fairness relates to
the disparity in producer utilities, and touches both group
and individual fairness. For example, (Hanna´k et al. 2017)
found racial and gender bias in ratings of freelancers on
freelance marketplaces, (Chakraborty et al. 2019) proposed
methods to ensure fair representation to different user groups
in social media, (Geyik, Ambler, and Kenthapadi 2019) pro-
posed fair exposure to candidates from different age and
gender groups in LinkedIn. (Biega, Gummadi, and Weikum
2018) considered individual producer fairness in ranking in
gig-economy platforms.
Few recent works have also explored fairness for both
producers and customers. For example, (Abdollahpouri and
Burke 2019; Burke 2017) categorized different types of
multi-stakeholder platforms and their desired fairness prop-
erties, (Su¨hr et al. 2019) presented a mechanism for two-
sided fairness in matching problems, (Su¨rer, Burke, and
Malthouse 2018) used minimum guarantee constraints for
producers and diversity constraints for customers while
recommending. However, these works have assumed that
the underlying customer-item relevance model remains un-
changed, whereas in reality, the algorithms go through fre-
quent updates. In this paper, we focus on fairness issues aris-
ing out of such platform updates in multi-sided platforms.
Egocentric Perceptions of Fairness: Multiple research
works have documented the existence of egocentric biases in
what people perceive as fair. Through experiments in game
theory (more specifically, Dictator Games and Ultimatum
Games), researchers have observed that individuals take fair-
ness concerns (such as equality) into account while distribut-
ing goods among players, and such concerns often origi-
nates from one’s sense of endowment (Bediou and Scherer
2014). Such endowment effect has also been studied in be-
havioral economics (Morewedge and Giblin 2015), where
researchers found that individuals perceive a new system to
be fair if the new outcomes are similarly beneficial as their
status quo outcomes from the existing system (Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). Following this line of work, in
this paper, we define the notions for egocentric fairness for
producers in two-sided platforms and propose mechanisms
to achieve the same.
Incrementalism: Incrementalism is a well-studied disci-
pline in public policy making, which advocates for creat-
ing policies in iterations where new policy will build upon
past policies, incorporating incremental rather than whole-
sale changes (Hayes 1992). Similar to policy issues, we ar-
gue for incremental algorithmic changes in two-sided plat-
forms to limit large disruptive changes.
Minimum Utility Guarantee: (Pollin et al. 2008; Green
and Harrison 2010; Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder 2006) proposed
minimum wage guarantee as a fairness standard, and (Lin
and Yun 2016; Engbom and Moser 2018) showed evidences
of how minimum wage guarantee decreases income inequal-
ity. Inspired by these works, we propose notion of minimum
utility guarantee for customer fairness.
3 Notations and Terminology
In this paper, U , P , S denote the sets of customers, pro-
ducers, and items respectively. Sp represents the set of all
items listed by a producer p such that
⋃
p∈P Sp = S. Ru
represents the set of k items recommended to customer u;
Ru ⊂ S, |Ru| = k. We assume k to be the same for every
customer. Next, we define the terms used in the paper.
Relevance of Items: Relevance of an item s to a customer
u represents the likelihood that u would prefer s. Formally,
we can define relevance as a real function of customer and
item; V : U × S → R, and V (u, s) denotes the relevance of
item s to customer u. Alternatively, we can consider V (u, s)
as the amount of utility gained by customer u if item s is
recommended to her.
Customer Utility: The utility of recommendation Ru to
u w.r.t. a particular relevance function V can be written as;
φ(Ru, V ) =
∑
s∈Ru V (u, s). u will get the maximum pos-
sible utility if k most relevant items – R∗u, is recommended
to her; φmaxu (V ) = φ(R
∗
u, V ) =
∑
s∈R∗u V (u, s). A normal-
ized form of customer utility from a recommendation Ru
would be: φnorm(Ru, V ) =
φ(Ru,V )
φmaxu (V )
= φ(Ru,V )φ(R∗u,V )
.
Producer Exposure: The utility of a producer is the
total amount of exposure/visibility its items get through
recommendations. The exposure of an item s is the to-
tal amount of attention it receives from all the cus-
tomers to whom s has been recommended. In an on-
line scenario, U can be thought of as the sequence of
customer-visits to the platform where some customers
may visit multiple times. If U([t1, t2)) is the sequence of
customer-logins in the interval [t1, t2), then the exposure
of an item s in the same interval will be Es([t1, t2)) =
1
k
∑
u∈U([t1,t2)) 1Ru(s), and that of a producer p will be
Ep([t1, t2)) =
1
k
∑
s∈Sp
∑
u∈U([t1,t2)) 1Ru(s)
1.
Note that, in this work, we assume that customers pay simi-
lar attention to all k recommended items, and leave the con-
sideration of position bias (i.e., top-ranked items may get
more attention than low-ranked ones) for future work. We
further assume an one-to-one correspondence between pro-
ducers and items, and henceforth use the terms ‘item’ and
‘producer’ interchangeably. This assumption is valid for
multiple platforms such as restaurant reservation/food deliv-
ery (Yelp, Google Local, Uber Eats), freelance marketplaces
(Fiverr), human resource matchmaking (LinkedIn, Naukri),
and so on. Even for e-commerce platforms where a producer
can list multiple items, ensuring fair exposure to individual
items would also ensure fairness at the producer level. Ad-
ditionally, we have presented a proposal to satisfy fairness
specifically at the producer level (not considering at the item
level) in the supplementary material.
The distribution of exposure received by the items can be
written as D = {Ds = Es∑
s∈S Es
∀s}. Given two exposure
distributions Dold and Dnew, we use L1-norm to calculate
overall change in exposure: EC(old,new) =
∑
s∈S |Dnews −
Dolds |.
In this paper, we assume that there is no change in overall de-
mand of any item during the update. Although this assump-
tion may not exactly replicate reality in some situations, but
it helps us to focus on the main issue of two-sided fairness
and bring out the nuances associated with it, rather than the
general issue of unpredictability of demand.
4 Updating Recommendations in
Two-Sided Platforms
In this section, we discuss the impact of platform updates on
exposure of the producers. To concretely highlight the im-
pact, we consider certain datasets, as well as different types
of updates that are undertaken in real-world platforms.
4.1 Datasets and Types of Updates
In this work, we use the following datasets and test different
types of updates on them.
1
1Ru(s) is 1 if s ∈ Ru, and 0 otherwise.
Amazon Reviews dataset: We use the dataset released by
(He and McAuley 2016), which comprises of customer re-
views and ratings for different Amazon products from the
grocery category. From this dataset, we shortlist 1, 000 most
active customers (i.e., who have reviewed most number of
products) and 1, 000 most reviewed products, and only con-
sider their corresponding ratings. Note that the rating act as a
proxy to relevance score and the ratings of all the customer-
item pairs are not available. Data-driven models are used
to calculate the missing relevance values of other customer-
item pairs. We test two kinds of updates on this dataset.
A. Changing the Model (Amazon-M): We test updating the
recommender system (or the relevance scoring model) from
a user-based collaborative filtering (Breese, Heckerman, and
Kadie 1998) (it works on the assumption that similar users
like same set of items) to a more sophisticated latent factor-
ization based model (Koren, Bell, and Volinsky 2009).
B. Updating Training Data (Amazon-D): The most com-
mon type of update is the addition of new training data
points. Here we calculate the relevance scores using a la-
tent factorization method. At first the model is trained on the
ratings received in the year 2013, and then trained on 2013
and 2014 rating data taken together.
We assume that since a platform is adopting a new recom-
mendation algorithm, implicitly that means improved accu-
racy, otherwise there is no reason for the adoption. As a
sanity check, our evaluation on held out ratings data shows
improvements of 21.78% and 32.46% in root-mean-square-
error by updating in Amazon-M and Amazon-D repectively.
Google Local dataset: We use data from Google Local,
released by (He, Kang, and McAuley 2017), containing data
about customers, local businesses and their locations (geo-
graphic coordinates), ratings, reviews etc. At any point in
time, we consider each customer’s last reviewed location as
a proxy for her location. We consider all active customers lo-
cated in New York City and the business entities listed there,
with more than 10 reviews. The dataset contains 45, 305 cus-
tomers, 3, 029 businesses and 89, 737 reviews.
C. Addition of New Feature(s) (GoogleLoc-F): Sometimes
a new feature (e.g., customers’ location) is added to im-
prove the relevance prediction model. We test an update
from a purely ratings-based recommendation, V old(u, s) =
rating(s), to a rating-cum-location based recommendation,
V new(u, s) = rating(s)distance(u,s) .
4.2 Modeling Customer Arrivals
As we do not have the temporal customer arrival/login
data, we model customer login events as Poisson point pro-
cesses (Chiu et al. 2013), where we consider every cus-
tomer’s logins to be independent of each other. The mean
inter-arrival time (time interval between two consecutive ar-
rivals on the platform) of each customer is sampled from a
truncated Gaussian distribution (range [0, 2]) with a mean of
1 period (exact definition of a period may vary from platform
to platform) and variance 0.2.
Dataset
% of items with change of exposure
< 50% 50− 100% 100 + %
Amazon-M 13.7 2.5 83.8
Amazon-D 24.1 6.7 69.2
GoogleLoc-F 0.12 1.17 98.71
Table 1: Percentage change in the exposure of individual
items due to immediate update of recommendations.
4.3 Impact of Immediate Updates
With the described customer arrival process, we implement
updates listed in §4.1 in an immediate manner and report the
distribution of the percentage changes in item exposures in
Table 1. It is clear from the table that across different types
of updates, 69 − 98% of the items experience more than
100% change (gain or loss) in their exposure values. Ex-
posure or visibility often correlates with sales or economic
opportunities on which the livelihood of many individuals
depends (Wu and Bolivar 2009; Ghandour et al. 2008). An
abrupt change (loss) in exposure could translate into eco-
nomic loss or even shutdown; an abrupt gain may lead to de-
generation of quality due to demand pressure. To capture the
unfairness associated with such abrupt changes, we formal-
ize the fairness notions for both producers and customers, as
discussed next.
4.4 Formalizing Fairness in Two-Sided Platforms
Egocentric Fairness for Producers: As mentioned ear-
lier, egocentric perception of fairness (Bediou and Scherer
2014; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991) depends on the
change from the status quo. We define a platform update to
be fair to the producers if the difference between the expo-
sure distribution in the new system and that in the old system
is minimal. More formally, if the new and previous exposure
distributions are Dnew and Dold respectively, then a platform
is egocentric fair if
∑
s∈S |Dnews − Dolds | < , where  is a
small positive number.
Minimum Guarantee for Customers: While being fair
to the producers, the platform should not compromise on
the satisfaction of the customers. We define a platform to be
fair to the customers if it guarantees a minimum utility for
everyone; φnorm(Ru, V new) ≥ θ,∀u ∈ U ; where V new is the
new relevance scoring function to be implemented, and θ is
the utility guarantee provided by the platform2.
Table 1 clearly shows that updating recommendations im-
mediately, violates the maxim of egocentric fairness for the
producers. To ensure fairness, a phased update strategy can
be undertaken. This is in line with research works in law,
macroeconomics and business philosophy (Malerba 1992;
2Our proposal is comparable with the fairness of minimum wage
guarantee (e.g., as required by multiple legislations in US, staring
from Fair Labor Standards Act 1938 to Fair Minimum Wage Act
2007) (Pollin et al. 2008; Green and Harrison 2010; Falk, Fehr,
and Zehnder 2006). While ensuring minimum wage does not itself
guarantee equality of income, it has been found to decrease income
inequality (Lin and Yun 2016; Engbom and Moser 2018).
Figure 1: Timeline representation of incremental update:
V old and V new are the current and new relevance scoring
functions. The points on time axis are τ−1 (1 period in past),
τ0 (present or start time of update), τη (end time). [τ0,τη)
is the time interval over which an incremental update will
be implemented.D0 is the observed exposure distribution in
[τ−1,τ0). Di is the exposure distribution to be observed in
step i ([τi−1,τi)). The objective of the proposed incremen-
tal update is to make each of the steps account for small
changes in exposure, so that the transition is smooth for the
items/producers, while ensuring fair customer utility.
Mintrom and Vergari 1996; Rabin 1997), where they have
advocated for incremental changes for easy societal adap-
tation. However, updating recommendations incrementally
in a two-sided market is challenging due to the dual task of
protecting the producers, as well as ensuring a certain level
of customer utility. We discuss this task in the next section.
5 Updating Recommendations Incrementally
In this section, we propose to update the recommendations
in η steps (or η periods). We define points on the time axis
like τ−1 (1 period in past), τ0 (present or start point), τ1,
· · · , τη (end point) such that [τi−1,τi) represents ith period
and the targeted update is achieved at τη . In each period, cus-
tomers visit the platform (as modeled in §4.2) and personal-
ized recommendation is provided to each of them. D0 is the
observed exposure distribution in [τ−1,τ0). Let Di represent
the exposure distribution to be observed in step i ([τi−1,τi)).
Figure 1 illustrates this online step-wise set up over time.
5.1 Incremental Update Formulation
Recommending items to minimize the exposure change can
hurt customer utility; while maximizing customer utility can
cause huge changes in exposure. To address this trade-off,
we can formulate optimization problem in two ways: (i)
one where we minimize exposure change constrained to
a lower bound on customer utility, and (ii) another where
we maximize customer utility constrained to an upper
bound on exposure change. In this paper, we use the former
one since the utility constraints are more interpretable
and exposure objectives can be easily operationalized in
an online scenario. We propose to come up with a target
exposure distribution Di for step i, that is, we try to make
the observed exposure distribution in step i as close as
possible to Di, thus the objective can be written as below.
minimize
∑
s∈S
∣∣∣∣Dis −Dis∣∣∣∣, ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , η} (1)
This objective needs to be transformed into an online ver-
sion which deals with each individual customer logging in
at certain points of time. Assuming a specific customer u′
logs into the platform at time t (t ∈ [τi−1, τi)), the objective
transforms into below.
argmin
Ru′
∑
s∈S
∣∣∣∣Ets + 1Ru′ (s)k − (|U([τi−1, t))|+ 1) ·Dis
∣∣∣∣ (2)
where Ets is the exposure of s in [τi−1, t),
1R
u′ (s)
k is the at-
tention to s from u′, (|U([τi−1, t))|+ 1) is the total number
of customer logins in [τi−1, t], and Dis is the target exposure
proportion for s in step i. As Dis is a fraction, its multiplica-
tion with number of customer logins produces the total tar-
geted exposure for s in [τi−1, t]; the difference shows how
far is the system from the target exposure.
Constraint for Minimum Utility: Along with the above
objective, we also have to ensure a minimum utility to the
customers, which would be a hard constraint. Thus, we use
a constraint with lower bound on the normalized customer
utility; For customer u′ at time t(t ∈ [τi−1, τi]), we impose
a constraint that the utility (based on new relevance scor-
ing V new) of the k-items chosen for the customer u′ in step
i must be above a threshold θi: φnorm(Ru′ , V new) ≥ θi or
φ(Ru′ , V
new) ≥ (θi · φmaxu′ (V new)).
We formulate this optimization problem as an Integer Lin-
ear Program (ILP). For customer u′ logging in at time t
(t ∈ [τi−1, τi)), we introduce |S| decision variables: Xu′,s
which is set to 1 if s is recommended to u′, and set to 0
otherwise. Now we write the ILP as below.
argmin
X
∑
s∈S
∣∣∣∣Ets + Xu′,sk − (|U([τi−1, t))|+ 1) ·Dis
∣∣∣∣ (3a)
s.t.
Xu′,s ∈ {0, 1} ∀s ∈ S (3b)∑
s∈S
Xu′,s = k (3c)∑
s∈S
Xu′,s · V new(u′, s) ≥ (θi · φmaxu′ (V new)) (3d)
Here, constraint-3b ensures keeping the variables binary.
Constraint-3c ensures selecting k items exactly. A minimum
customer utility is guaranteed by constraint-3d.
5.2 Parameter Setting
There are two important parameters in the ILP formualation
Dis and θi which need to be fixed.
Setting Dis: We propose two different ways to set the tar-
get exposure distributions for each step (Di for step i).
A. Estimated Steps: Using the current customer arrival fre-
quency (as in U([τ−1, τ0)) we can find an estimate of the
final exposure distribution for the new relevance scoring
(i.e., using top-k of V new for U([τ−1, τ0)) and let that be
Dpred. Imagining D0 and Dpred as points in multidimen-
sional space (with |S| dimensions), our proposition is to
enforce certain level of change towards Dpred in each step.
Thus we set the target exposure distribution for step i as:
Dis = D
0
s + i · δ, ∀s, i, where δ = 1η (Dpreds −D0s).
B. Preserving Steps: Here, we set target exposure distribu-
tion of a step to the observed one in last step (we try to pre-
serve the observed exposure), i.e., Dis = Di−1s , ∀s, i.
Setting θi: We use linearly increasing and geometrically
increasing settings for θi.
A. Linear Steps: θi = iη , for 1 < i < η,
B. Geometric Steps: θi = θi−1 + 2−i for 1 < i < η, while
θ0 = 0, and θη = 1.
5.3 Approximate Solution with Prefiltering
As our ILP operates on the whole item space, huge item
space of some systems can be bottleneck for the ILP solvers.
To deal with this issue, we propose to prefilter the item
space, and then run the ILP on filtered (smaller) item space
for an approximate solution. We prefilter in following two
ways and merge the two filtered lists to get a smaller item
space: (i) top-(k2) (k = recommendation set size) items us-
ing new relevance scoring (V new), which can help in satis-
fying the customer utility constraint, and (ii) top-(k2) items
based on
∣∣ Ets∑
s′∈S Ets′
− Dτis
∣∣, which can help in minimizing
the objective function. We test the proposed ILP with both
unfiltered and prefiltered item spaces in §6.
5.4 Baselines
Only a few prior works consider incremental changes; how-
ever they do not necessarily cater to two-sided platforms.
Baseline-1 (CanD): Canary deployment (Tseitlin and Son-
dow 2017) (also known as phased roll out or incremental
roll out) is a popular approach traditionally used in software
deployment, where a new software version is slowly rolled
out in production for subsets of customers to reduce the risk
of imminent failure in an unseen environment.
Baseline-2 (IRF): Another approach for incremental up-
date would be to introduce intermediate relevance func-
tions for each of the steps (gradually moving the relevance
scores from V old to V new); relevance function for step i:
V i(u, s) = (1 − i
η
) · V old(u, s) + i
η
· V new(u, s), ∀u, s. We can
recommend the top-k according to V i(u, s) in step i.
6 Experimental Evaluation
For each customer u′ logging into the platform at time t, we
solve the proposed ILP with different settings which gives
a set of items to be recommended. Using these results, we
calculate and record item exposures and customer utilities
in each step. We set the number of steps η = 10, and size
of recommendation k = 10. We use cvxpy (cvxpy.org)
paired with Gurobi solver (gurobi.com) for solving the
ILP. In this section, we use the following abbreviations: E-
Estimated, P- Preserving steps in Di; L- Linear, G- Geo-
metric steps in θi; PF- Prefiltering.
6.1 Producer-Centric Metrics
First we define metric for change in exposure.
Exposure Change (EC): Given two exposure distributions
Dold and Dnew, exposure change (EC) is given by their L1
Method
Amazon-M
(EC(0, η) = 1.922)
Amazon-D
(EC(0, η) = 1.557)
GoogleLoc-F
(EC(0, η) = 1.967)
Υ pi Z Υ pi Z Υ pi Z
CanD 1.63 0.17 0.99 1.34 0.21 0.99 1.38 0.16 0.99
IRF 1.48 0.95 0.62 1.46 0.19 0.98 1.46 0.98 0.59
ILP-EL 1.03 0.12 0.99 1.04 0.13 0.99 1.04 0.11 0.99
ILP-EL(PF) 1.16 0.13 0.99 1.45 0.16 0.99 1.33 0.15 0.99
ILP-EG 1.18 0.28 0.93 1.12 0.22 0.97 1.16 0.19 0.96
ILP-PL 1.06 0.46 0.61 1.02 0.74 0.33 1.08 0.29 0.90
ILP-PG 1.10 0.30 0.86 1.08 0.23 0.86 1.24 0.29 0.90
Table 2: Producer-Centric Metrics for η = 10 and k = 10. CanD and IRF are the two baselines. For ILP-based methods we use
abbreviations like; E: Estimated, P: Preserving steps in Di; L: Linear, G: Geometric steps in θi ; PF: Prefiltering item space.
distance (also defined in §3); EC(old, new) = ∑s∈S |Dnews −
Dolds | Based on EC, we define the following three metrics.
A. Transition Path Length (Υ) - Efficiency metric.
It is the sum of all exposure changes that the transition has
gone through, relative to that of an immediate update.
Υ =
∑
i∈{1···η}EC(i− 1, i)
EC(0, η)
(4)
The lower the path length, the more efficient is the transition.
B. Maximum Transition Cost (Π) - Fairness metric.
Π =
max
i
[EC(i− 1, i)]
EC(0, η)
(5)
Π checks the largest change during the incremental transi-
tion process relative to that of an immediate update; even a
single big exposure change is undesirable as it is inherently
disadvantageous (unfair) for producers.
C. Transition Inequality (Z) - Fairness metric.
Transition Inequality captures the dissimilarity in the quan-
tum of transition among the steps, measured by entropy as
defined below.
Z = −
∑
i∈{1···η}
(
EC(i− 1, i)
M
) log10(
EC(i− 1, i)
M
) (6)
where M =
∑
i∈{1···η}EC(i− 1, i).
An ideal update will have high efficiency (or low Υ), and
small & equal sized changes (or low pi and high Z ).
6.2 Producer-Side Results
Table 2 reports the above metrics for all the baselines and
proposed methods on different datasets.
Performance of Baselines: CanD ensures small (Π), per-
forms very well in maintaining similar level of changes at
each step (Z); but, CanD is less efficient due to high path
lengths (Υ) as the changes (change from Di−1 to Di in step
i) it introduces may or may not be directed towards Dη . The
performance of IRF is not stable; in Amazon-M and Google-
F, it performs very poorly in both the fairness metrics Π and
Z (the reason becomes clear when we look at the customer
side results); It also shows poor efficiency (Υ) like CanD.
Performance of ILP-Estimated (EL/EG): ILP-EL shows the
lowest Π and highest Z making it the most fair method for
the producers; it is very efficient (Υ) too; ILP-EL with pre-
filtering(PF) also performs better (in pi and Z) than baselines
and other ILP settings; however it incurs a loss in efficiency
Υ due to its filtered item space. ILP-EG performs worse than
ILP-EL in all metrics.
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Figure 2: Exposure changes at all the steps (EC(i− 1, i) =∑
s∈S |Dis−Di−1s |) are plotted (x-axis: steps i, y-axis: EC)
for Amazon-M. Hyperparameters: η = 10, k = 10.
Performance of ILP-Preserving (PL/PG): ILP-PL shows
very efficient (Υ) transitions; however it performs very
poorly in pi and Z which makes it even more unfair than
CanD. On the other hand, ILP-PG shows good results com-
parable to ILP-EL and ILP-EG. The reasons become clear
when we study the individual EC plots (elaborated next).
EC Exposure Change Plots: We plot exposure changes
(EC) at each of the steps of updates for Amazon-M in Fig-
ure 2 (similar plots for other datasets are provided in supple-
mentary material). We see small and equal sized changes for
CanD and ILP-EL, however CanD produces slightly larger
changes; this explains their similar Z performances, but dif-
ferent Υ and pi. Both ILP-EG and ILP-PG show dissimilar
changes in different steps; thus slightly larger Υ and pi, and
slightly lower Z. IRF causes huge change in the first step
while ILP-PL shows large changes in the last few steps; this
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
0.6
0.8
1
Steps
m
ea
n
φ
Amazon-M
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Steps
st
d
φ
Amazon-M
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
0.6
0.8
1
Steps
m
ea
n
φ
Amazon-D
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Steps
st
d
φ
Amazon-D
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Steps
m
ea
n
φ
GoogleLoc-F
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
0
0.1
0.25
Steps
st
d
φ
GoogleLoc-F
CanD IRF ILP-EL
ILP-EG ILP-PL ILP-PG
Figure 3: Mean (left column) and standard deviation (right)
of φnorm(Ru, V new) ∀u ∈ U([τi−1, τi)) for each step i.
explains their high pi and very low Z values.
6.3 Customer-Centric Metrics
In each step i for each customer u ∈ U([τi−1, τi)), we ob-
tain the utility φnorm(Ru′ , V new); We calculate their mean
and standard deviation and plot them in Figure 3. The faster
the mean utility grows, the faster the update applies. The
standard deviation indicates the degree of unfairness.
6.4 Customer-Side Results
We explain the salient points of the results (in Figure 3).
Performance of Baselines: The rise in mean customer util-
ities for CanD is comparable to ILPs, however for IRF it is
much faster. Note that CanD incurs large standard deviation,
i.e., it introduces larger disparity in customer utilities, which
is undesirable. The IRF shows a large increase in mean util-
ity in the first step of Amazon-M and GoogleLoc-F which
essentially means it fails to update incrementally; thus the
producer fairness is severely compromised (correspondingly
refer to Figure 3 and Table 2); As in IRF, we choose the top-
k results using intermediate relevance functions, the inter-
mediate function (V 1) at step 1 drastically changes (it could
have happened at any other step too) the top-k set making it
close to the top-k of V new; This explains the large increase in
mean utility and the large exposure change in the first step in
those datasets (refer Figure 3,2 respectively). However, this
is a very data-specific phenomenon as it doesn’t happen in
the Amazon-D. For the baseline methods, we see the above
issues in ensuring producer and customer fairness; Reliabil-
ity is also a major concern.
Performance of ILPs: By design, all ILPs ensure minimum
utility guarantee to the customers in each of the steps. The
ILPs (EG and PG) with geometric steps in θi increases the
customer utilities quickly while the ILPs (EL and PL) with
linear steps in θi show slower improvements. In Amazon-
D, Amazon-M, Google-Loc, the status quo (period 0) mean
utilities are near to 0.57, 0.61 and 0.19 correspondingly.
Thus for ILP-Preserving (PL/PG), when there are scopes
(θi becomes more than status quo utility), the ILPs show
an update; This explains why ILP-PL generally shows sig-
nificant updates (increase in utility Fig-3 and change in ex-
posure Fig-2) only after some initial steps; while ILP-PG
shows updates earlier due to geometric increase in θi and
performs better. However for ILP-Estimated (EL/EG), such
issue never comes as they enforce estimated changes in ex-
posure (by setting Di) along with increase in θi in each step.
The standard deviation of all the ILPs are small; the ILP-
(EL/PL) have slightly higher values.
Summary: ILP-EL performs best in terms of producer fair-
ness; its performance in maintaining customer utility is
as per design; however, as the name suggests ILP-EL re-
quires an estimation of change in producer exposure apriori.
Whereas, ILP-PG performs a bit inferior to ILP-EL in terms
of producer fairness but much better than baselines; the in-
crease in customer utility is faster than ILP-EL. Most im-
portantly, it doesn’t require any estimation of the exposure
change for designing each step which makes it an attractive
choice. However, our aim has been to explore a whole range
of possibilities, and leave it to the designer to choose one as
per their requirement and available resources.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we identified the adverse impact on the produc-
ers due to immediate updates in recommendations in two-
sided platforms, and proposed an innovative ILP-based in-
cremental update mechanism to tackle it. Extensive evalu-
ations over multiple datasets and different types of updates
show that our proposed approach not only allows smoother
transition of producer exposures, but also guarantees a min-
imum customer utility in intermediate steps. In future, we
plan to check the impact of updates in more complex set-
tings, such as when the assumption of closed market (where
neither new producers/customers enter the system nor the
overall demand fluctuates) is relaxed. We also plan to con-
sider position/ranking bias in customer attention.
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A Appendix
A.1 Linear and Geometric Steps in θi
We plot the customer utility lower bounds θi for step i of the
proposed ILPs for two different settings in Figure-4. As the
lower bound θi grows much faster in geometric steps than in
linear steps, we see faster growth of geometric steps setting.
This is why we see faster increase in mean customer utility
in ILP-EG/PG than in ILP-EL/PL (refer Figure-3).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Steps
θi
Linear Steps Geometric Steps
Figure 4: Steps in θi
A.2 Consolidated EC Plots
We plot EC in each of the steps of all the baselines and pro-
posed methods for all the datasets in Figure-7. The rows of
plots are for certain methods and the columns are for cer-
tain datasets as titled in bold font. The plots are generated
with same setting as in the main paper (i.e., hyperparame-
ters k = 10, η = 10).
A.3 Consolidated φnorm Plots
In each step i for each customer u ∈ U([τi−1, τi)) (i.e., in
period i), we obtain the utility φnorm(Ru, V new); We calcu-
late their mean, minimum and standard deviation and plot
all of them in Figure-8. The faster the mean utility grows,
the faster the update applies. The standard deviation indi-
cates the degree of unfairness. The minimum utility (not dis-
cussed in main paper) in each step shows if any customer
is too much deprived of utility in the corresponding step.
From the minimum utility plots, we see that our proposed
ILPs have been able to maintain minimum customer utility
more than the guaranteed lower bound. However the base-
line CanD has been unable to beat the same minimum util-
ity; this is because CanD chooses customers randomly in
each step for whom it updates the recommendations; those
customers who have very less utility in status-quo and do not
get selected for many number the steps, they continue to get
very less utility.
A.4 Effects of η
We test the best performing (as discussed in §6) or the ILP
with EL settings (estimated steps in Di and linear steps in
θi) with varying values for number of steps (η). We find
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Figure 5: Maximum transition cost pi vs. Number of steps η
(Amazon-M, ILP-EL)
that by increasing the number of steps (η), we can ensure
better transitions as illustrated in Figure-5 (transition cost
decreases with increase in η). However, we don’t see any
significant change in Υ and Z in the same test.
A.5 ILP at Producer-Level
We extend our proposed ILP (as in Equation-3a) to
producer-level as below.
argmin
X
∑
p∈P
∑
s∈Sp
∣∣∣∣Etp + Xu′,sk − (|U([τi−1, t))|+ 1) ·Dip
∣∣∣∣ (7a)
s.t.
Xu′,s ∈ {0, 1}∀s ∈ S (7b)∑
s∈S
Xu′,s = k (7c)∑
s∈S
Xu′,s · V new(u′, s) ≥ (θi · φmaxu′ (V new)) (7d)
Here the objective-7a tries to minimize the sum of differ-
ences between observed exposure and targeted exposure of
each producer while recommending items to u′ at time t
(t ∈ [τi−1, τi) or period i). The constraints remain the same
as in Equations-3b, 3c, 3d.
We use the Amazon dataset and consider the first four
characters of the item-id as the brand/producer of the corre-
sponding item. The resulting dataset has 16 producers sup-
plying 1 − 191 items. Next we test the above ILP with
EL settings (estimated steps in Di and linear steps in θi)
on Amazon-M case with producer information; we find the
evaluation metrics as Υ = 1.33, pi = 0.17, and Z = 0.99.
These values are very comparable to the item-level results of
Table-2.
We also plot the EC and mean φnorm at each step in
Figure-6.
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Figure 7: Exposure changes (EC(i − 1, i) = ∑s∈S |Dis − Di−1s |) in baselines and proposed ILPs (rows) on all the dataset
(columns) are plotted (x-axis: steps i, y-axis: EC). The blue bars show the value of exposure change in each of the steps while
the red boldline shows the exposure change caused by an immediate update. Hyperparameters: η = 10, k = 10
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Figure 8: Mean (first row), minimum (second row) and standard deviation (third row) of φnorm(Ru, V new) over all u in each of
the steps of the update are plotted; Amazon-M (first column), Amazon-D (second column), GoogleLoc-F (third column).
